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Abstract 
The manner in which central and local governments engage has taken on extra salience in recent 
years as governments seek to address wicked issues and begin to appreciate the role of place as a key 
contributor of economic growth.  Different approaches exist, ranging from formal and constitutional 
to informal and political, but none represents a magic bullet with outcomes always subject to local 
circumstances.  In this context the example of New Zealand highlights a particular challenge; how to 
maintain effective of inter-governmental relationships in the absence of either constitutional 
recognition of local government or a formal agreement between the two sectors.  
 
In 1839, within six months of arriving in Port Nicholson1 after leaving their home country of England 
and a year before the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi which gave Britain legal oversight, the 1400 
or so new settlers agreed to establish a council to provide order in the new town, reflecting “those 
constitutional principles which every Englishman (sic) is taught to regard as his birthright” (Carman 
1970 p. 25). Within months of the council’s formation a furious Lieutenant-Governor Hobson, the 
British Government’s representative in that country, concerned at such an affront to his authority 
arrived in the barque Integrity, accompanied by 30 troops and constables, to close such “high treason” 
down.  It was an event that in a number of ways has characterised local government’s relationship 
with central government since that time.  It was an inauspicious start to local central relationships.2 
 
                                           
1 Port Nicholson was the early settler name given to what is now known as Wellington, the capital of New Zealand. 
2 The phrase central-local government relations is used to describe relationships between local governments and either state 
or provincial governments in federal systems or central governments in unitary systems.  In New Zealand local government 
incorporates regional councils. 
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While it is much less common today for higher level governments to send warships to sort out their 
unruly local colleagues, finding the optimal mechanisms for managing inter-governmental 
relationships remains unfinished business, influenced as it is by local government’s constitutional 
position and is heavily path dependant.  Finding the appropriate mix of roles between local and central 
governments is necessary, as the business of governing requires an ability to balance the differing 
needs and expectations of both local and national communities.  Meeting the social and economic 
needs of communities is seldom achieved by the actions of the centre acting alone, and clever 
governments manage to address the national interest while allowing diversity and difference to 
flourish at the sub-national level.  The policy question, for those responsible for designing governance 
systems, is how to enable local and regional innovation within a national framework - in other words 
how to recognise the mutual roles of governments at all levels.  Consequently managing inter-
governmental relationships is a public policy challenge that few countries have satisfactorily resolved.  
It remains a particularly salient issue in New Zealand. 
Governing as a multi-stakeholder exercise 
In its briefing paper to the incoming government in November 2011, Local Government New Zealand 
(the local government association) requested that the relationship between local and central 
government should be governed by some form of jointly negotiated agreement.  As proposed by the 
association the agreement would set out the mutual expectations of each sphere of government 
towards the other and provide a basis for negotiating shared goals.  At the time of writing there has 
been no response to the association’s request.  In fact, rather than the partnership envisaged by the 
association, the Government appears to be committed to a much more ‘hands on’ approach to 
managing if not controlling the performance of its local governments; concepts of shared goals are 
mere afterthoughts when compared with the twin goals of efficiency and productivity.  Yet 
agreements do seem to be of increasing interest internationally, whether to recognise the value of 
local collaboration or as relatively frugal mechanisms through which to influence the behaviours of 
sub-national governments.   
The notion of spheres of government engaging in dialogue to achieve some form of improvement in 
community well-being reflects a new appreciation of the business of governing (Kjaear 2004, 
Leuprecht and Lazar 2007).  The value applies across policy domains, for example, the value of 
coordination was specifically recognised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in its study of regulation in Ireland when it noted that: 
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Local governments within the boundary of a state need increasing flexibility to meet economic, 
social and environmental goals in their particular geographical and cultural setting... this 
requires a pro-active consideration of: 
• The allocation/sharing of regulatory responsibilities at the different levels of government.  
• The coordination mechanisms between different levels of government (OECD 2010, 
p. 153). 
 
The OECD goes on to recommend that the coordination and consultation mechanisms operating 
between local and central government in the Irish Republic should be reviewed with the objective of 
strengthening existing mechanisms.  It specifically mentions the possibility of holding an annual 
forum.  The OECD’s report on regulation within the Republic also acknowledges that good 
governance is what we might describe as a multi-stakeholder exercise which places particular 
emphasis on both spheres of government having effective coordination mechanisms.  The analysis 
reflects the growing influence of governance theory on the topic of inter-governmental discourse 
(Kjaer 2004, Albrow 2001).  Governance theory itself tends to focus on: 
• The existence of multiple stakeholders, particularly in relation to collective problems that cannot 
be solved by the public sector working by itself but requires the co-operation of other players (for 
example, citizens, business, voluntary not-for-profit sector and media);  
 
• The presence of formal rules (such as constitutions, laws and regulations) and informal rules 
(such as codes of ethics, customs and traditions); 
 
• The role of market and quasi-market structures (as a form of steering), hierarchies (such as 
bureaucracies) and co-operative networks (as possible structures for facilitating change in some 
situations) (see Loffler 2003). 
In short governance is concerned with the behaviour of multiple actors and involves the formation and 
stewardship of rules, both formal and informal, that control the public space in which economic and 
social actors interact to make decisions.  This process is underpinned by negotiation, “the means for 
achieving direction, control, and co-ordination of individuals and organisations with varying degrees 
of autonomy to advance joint objectives” (Kjaer 2004, p. 282). 
Simply put, governance involves operating across institutional boundaries in a context where 
traditional command and control approaches are increasingly inappropriate and ineffective in order to 
address particular problems.  Consequently a new set of governing skills is required, skills that 
recognise the autonomy of agents and place more emphasis on persuasion and negotiation than 
direction.  It is a challenging prospect for higher level governments where the normal local central 
government relationship is strongly hierarchical and the narrative is concerned with managing risk 
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and strengthening accountability.  A focus on governance also raises questions of formality and 
whether or not relationships can over time move from informal to formal in order to compensate for 
the constitutional weakness of many local government systems.   
The nature of engagement 
One of the public policy issues that all governments confront at some point is how best to engage with 
their local and regional governments.  Should the relationship be hierarchical, reflecting their relative 
constitutional positions, or more of a partnership, recognising their complementary roles in 
governance?  Alternatively, should the relationship have elements of both?  ‘Engagement’ is a term 
that has become increasingly popular for describing, what is frequently, a broad church of interaction 
between spheres of government (Aulich et al 2011).  It implies a meaningful interaction but stops 
short of a commitment to ongoing collaboration or partnership, although both might be a consequence 
of good engagement.  It occurs across a range of dimensions, from the operational and policy 
dimensions to the political.  While operational and policy engagement tends to be strongly issue-
focused and driven by events, for example the joint response to the Christchurch earthquakes, the 
political dimension is considerably more complex particularly in local government systems lacking a 
strong ‘formal’ political party presence.  
Engagement implies at the very least two parties that, while not being equal in constitutional terms, 
participate as independent entities.  While constitutional authority will frequently lie with higher 
spheres of government, a range of measures - from legislative and regulatory to persuasive - can be 
employed to ‘steer local governments’.  This paper is primarily concerned with the non-coercive 
dimension of those relationships which primarily involve dialogue and what might be called 
institutionalised discourse. 
In their study of what makes successful cities, the Fannie Mae Foundation (2007), a US think tank, 
noted two principles that higher level governments should ascribe to in their relationships with local 
government. One was the simple principle of ‘do no harm’, reflecting the ever-present danger of 
unintended consequences when governments intervene.  The other was the desirability of enabling 
local governments and their representative bodies to contribute to decision-making processes that 
have the potential to impact directly on citizens.  In the Foundation’s view, local governments play a 
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critical role through their ability to critique proposals put forward by national and/or state legislators 
and to identify potential negative impacts.3  
Diminishing or avoiding harm and providing opportunities to contribute to decision-making 
necessarily implies some form of engagement, and indeed agreement, and a range of models exist.  
New Zealand has gone some way towards achieving this by its practice of holding an annual meeting 
between local government leaders, the Prime Minister and senior Cabinet Ministers.4  However, New 
Zealand is not the only country to experiment with new institutional mechanisms for enhancing 
engagement.  We see continual evidence that governments and associations throughout the world are 
working on innovative and constructive approaches to improve engagement, and many offer 
interesting lessons.  
The constitutional context of inter-governmental relationships in unitary countries is nicely captured 
by the central-local concordant, signed between the English Parliament and the Local Government 
Association in 2007, which states: 
 
Central and local government both derive their legitimacy from Parliament and the 
electoral mandate granted them by individual citizens who look to central and local 
government to take the lead in ensuring better places and better services (DCLG 2007).  
 
The Concordant goes on to argue that this shared mandate means that both central and local 
government are effectively partners in delivering improved services and strengthening democracy.  
While central government has responsibility to act in the national interest, councils have a similar 
responsibility in relation to the interests of citizens in communities defined by place.  It is a statement, 
however, that demands some clarification as to how the boundary between the national and local 
interest should be defined - a question for which there can never be a simple answer and which is 
clearly negotiated within particular contexts and influenced by the nature of inter-governmental 
relationships.  Not surprisingly approaches to engagement vary, reflecting countries’ different 
constitutional settings, historical patterns of development and the varied preferences of political 
actors, both local and national.  
 
                                           
3 A particular sore point is New Zealand where government departments often develop detailed legislative proposals that 
directly affect local government without consultation. 
4 In 2007 the President of Local Government New Zealand (the local government association) was invited to brief the House 
of Common’s Local Government Select Committee about the way in which engagement between the two spheres of 
government in New Zealand was operating. 
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Why engage?  
The emergence of multi-level governance “challenges much of our traditional understanding of how 
the state operates, what determines its capacities, what its contingencies are and ultimately the 
organisation of democratic and accountable government” (Peters and Pierre 2001, p. 131).  Formal 
constitutional arrangements are today less aligned with the locus of political power, which is 
increasingly found in the ability of agencies to coordinate resources drawn from both public and 
private interests.  The command and control state is shifting towards an enabling state, more 
concerned with defining objectives and mustering resources (Peters and Pierre 2001, p. 131), with the 
result that the process of governing is more about aligning and steering than directing.  This is 
particularly relevant to spheres of government, national, provincial and local. 
Higher level governments have a number of reasons for wishing to influence the behaviour of their 
sub-national colleagues, including engagement with national local government bodies. These include 
for example: 
• To encourage councils to voluntarily promote the government’s (national) objectives, such as to 
support efforts to grow the economy or contribute to initiatives to ameliorate climate change; 
• To diminish the risk of councils undermining the government’s (national) objectives, for 
example, by failing to invest in local infrastructure with the risk of municipal service failure and 
investor flight; 
• To make use of locally gained knowledge and experience in order to improve the development of 
national policies and programmes; 
• To help resolve conflict, particularly where additional mandates, especially unfunded mandates, 
have been imposed on local government (Gormley 2006).  
The overriding motive, however, is likely to be to protect the national interest, whether from fiscal 
risk or to protect a landscape of national importance.  To achieve their objectives governments 
possess a number of instruments with which to influence the behaviour of councils - these range from 
instruments which are coercive and direct, like legislation and regulation, to instruments that are non-
coercive and indirect, such as tied grants, training incentives and investment in best practice.  In 
reality, however, the number of coercive instruments governments can use without either diminishing 
local democracy (which is the point of local government), or creating substantial costs and community 
resistance, is limited.  Legislation is not inexpensive; there is competition for both analyst and 
parliamentary time and the risk that a government’s original objective might be lost as draft 
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legislation works its way through the system is ever present.  Consequently using less direct and more 
persuasive steering mechanisms is increasingly favoured (Dollery and Wallis 2001).   
It is a trend that appears to be occurring in many OECD countries with a shift away from prescriptive 
and hierarchical steering approaches, which are often expensive to implement, to approaches based on 
voluntary compliance.  For example, Banner (2002) argues that in the future governments will make 
increasing use of three dominant steering strategies, each of them a “bottom-up” form of steering.   
These are: 
• Empowering the market through measures that require councils to subject their activities to 
competitive testing.  This a form of ‘non-steering’ which operates on the basis that the 
appropriate direction is whatever the market chooses.  In New Zealand the best example is the 
requirement that councils receiving roading funds from the New Zealand Transport Agency must 
put all projects out for competitive tender;   
 
• Empowering the community through enabling greater participation in council affairs and 
increased voice.  In New Zealand this strategy is given expression through the requirement that 
councils publish draft plans and budgets and subject them to formal consultation with citizens;5   
 
• Increasing transparency and promoting a “sustained public discussion on City Hall performance” 
(ibid p. 227).  In New Zealand the requirement on councils to develop and publish ten year 
financial strategies and more recently publish pre-election reports describing their financial 
circumstances are all intended to promote sustained dialogue on performance.  A framework that 
removes the government from hands-on steering (using instead markets and citizens themselves) 
reduces the need for “top down” direction and improves the opportunity for local and central 
government to engage as equals or partners. 
 
From a local government perspective there are two major reasons for formalising relationships 
between spheres of government. The first, and instrumental, approach is very simply an attempt, 
particularly by sub-national governments, to gain a greater role in decision-making about their own 
roles and legislative frameworks.  We might speculate that this approach is likely to be stronger in 
countries where local governments lack constitutional recognition and face an unstable and uncertain 
legislative environment – effectively operating at the whim of whichever party secures a majority in 
the national or state parliament.  These relationships are likely to stress principles guaranteeing early 
involvement in the design of central or provincial policies and regulations directly affecting the local 
                                           
5 Tellingly in her speech to the third reading of the Local Government Bill 2002 the then Minister of Local Government, the 
Hon. Sandra Lee, stated that this bill is not about empowering councils but rather empowering citizens to control their 
councils. 
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government sector.6  The second rationale is more pragmatic and views engagement as necessary to 
address so called “wicked issues”.  Wicked issues, or malignant problems, are issues which have the 
following characteristics: 
• There is no definitive statement of the problem (and there may be disagreement on its nature); 
 
• Without a definition the search for solutions is open-ended, with a tendency for people to frame 
“problems” to better connect with their preferred solutions; 
 
• The problem-solving process is complex because constraints, such as resources and political 
ramifications, are constantly changing; 
 
• Constraints change because they are generated by numerous interested parties, which selectively 
choose to share information and may change the rules by which the problem must be solved 
(Roberts 2000). 
 
Addressing wicked issues inevitably requires multiple collaborations and predicates a shift away from 
governments as providers of services to one of governing - an exercise that is inherently collaborative.  
As Kooiman argues: 
 
No single actor, public or private, has all the knowledge ad information required to solve 
complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient over view to make the 
application of needed instruments effective: no single actor has sufficient action potential to 
dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model (Kooiman 1993:4 in Kennett 2010). 
If we accept that governing is a task that occurs amongst multiple public and plural institutions, then 
we are left with an understanding that governing is inherently messy, that is, it represents a policy 
space where rules and command and control approaches are unlikely to work and new instruments are 
required which balance ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches.  From a local government 
perspective, councils’ generally subservient constitutional status means that engagement is, if nothing 
else, a form of risk insurance which ensures that national decision-makers are aware of local 
government’s views when developing policy and making decisions.  Yet engagement is more than 
simply good risk management, other rationales include: 
 
• That councils provide citizens with a mechanism for making decisions about the way their cities, 
districts and regions are governed.  Councils need to engage with central government in order to 
ensure they have the ‘tools’ and frequently the resources to meet community expectations and 
                                           
6 For example, an ongoing cause for concern expressed by members of New Zealand and Australian local governments has 
been the tendency for higher level governments to design policies and programmes for local government implementation 
without any consultation with local government. 
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develop innovative solutions to local issues.  Addressing local expectations often means ‘lining 
up’ government departments working in the district; 
 
• That because of their role in communities, councils acquire considerable knowledge and 
information about community issues and concerns.  Engagement enables this information to be 
brought to the attention of the government and its departments and consequently inform policy 
and operational decisions affecting particular localities.  Accepting the role that ‘place’ plays in 
national economic development, engagement enables local authorities to seek support from 
higher level governments for proposals that may have both local and national benefits; 
 
• That effective relationships at a national level can also be used to model relationships between 
individual councils and government agencies, enabling local and central government officials to 
build relationships in order to increase understanding of each others’ roles and how they 
contribute to common outcomes.  Alignment can reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication and 
provides opportunities for officials from both sectors to identify more innovative and effective 
solutions to common problems.  Initiatives introduced by New Labour in England, such as Local 
Area Agreements (LAAs) and Total Place, were ways of attempting to provide institutional form 
to such collaboration.  The current Conservative Liberal democratic government continues to 
experiment with similar approaches. 
 
Place as a driver for engagement 
If there was one particular justification for an increased interest in inter-governmental engagement 
over recent years it is the perception that ‘place’ matters, that despite the growth of technologies 
which create new communities of interest, communities based on geography continue to play a critical 
role.  Michael Lyons' inquiry into local government (Lyons 2007) tackled this question head on and 
concluded that the local role was becoming stronger as society becomes more diverse.  Noting that 
different local authority areas have different views on what constitutes the good life.  Lyons quotes 
the Tavistock Institute which suggested that in the future: 
Many of the pressures on government will manifest most dramatically at a local level.  More 
flexibility and responsiveness at a local level would significantly enhance government’s 
capacity to meet those challenges successfully (Lyons 2007 p. 57). 
Economic policy globalisation and the mobility of skilled workers makes place an important asset, 
and local governments are well placed to engage with citizens and work with local partners to plan 
and deliver services to meet community priorities.  In addition there has been a growing 
acknowledgement of the importance of cities as a locus of growth, innovation and investment 
(Albrechts 1991).  If cities are to achieve their potential, and in doing so contribute to national 
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economic and social well-being, then councils will need to not only maintain but to increase their 
investment in city infrastructure, both soft and hard.  In a world of constrained choices Lyons suggests 
that local choice, exercised through a democratic framework, to prioritise resources in the face of 
competing needs is critically important.   
In the face of growing diversity and information asymmetry, national governments often lack the 
policy capacity and legitimacy to ensure successful outcomes at a community level and are poorly 
suited to deliver policies and programmes to communities with diverse preferences (Oates1972).  In a 
world in which innovation and knowledge have become the attributes of success, institutional 
arrangements which disperse public decision-making and empower citizens to have greater influence 
over how decisions are made are more likely to prosper.  Lyons has drawn on the concept of place in 
his approach to governance.  This is reflected in the notion of ‘place-shaping’ defined as the “creative 
use of powers and influence to promote the general well-being of a community and its citizens” (ibid 
p.60).  Particular aspects of the place-shaping role include building and shaping local identity; 
understanding local needs and preferences; representing the community and local partnerships.   
It is in the context of place and its importance to the outcomes that governments seek to promote that 
the topic of central-local government engagement has become of greater interest, not only to the 
parties involved but also to academics and commentators. 
The dynamics of engagement  
Much of the academic interest in engagement is drawn from the European context where councils 
play a major role in the delivery of social services, and where failure of local governance is likely to 
deliver diminishing outcomes to citizens.  Comparative studies tend to focus on the different factors 
that influence the interface between spheres of government and seek to answer the question why it 
works well in some societies and not in others. Blom-Hansen (1999), for example, notes that the 
characteristics of inter-governmental relationships vary considerably across jurisdictions and are 
influenced by: 
 
• the nature of the constitutional makeup, whether it is federal or unitary;  
• the existence and strength of political parties;  
• level of urbanisation; 
• the nature of the welfare state – decentred or not;  
• the nature of the recruitment patterns to national parliaments; 
• the historical backgrounds of the local government systems.   
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The result is a range of factors that determine the nature of the central-local government relationship, 
which may also vary according to policy area.  Governments will take a stronger interest in those 
activities of local governments that affect the national interest than those which are purely local in 
impact.  In New Zealand, for example, this is particularly noticeable in relation to local government’s 
role in environmental management and land use, with increasing central government intervention 
(using a command and control approach) in relation to urban growth and the effect of metropolitan 
urban limits.  The government is concerned that national policies focused in creating more affordable 
housing might be put at risk by council policies favouring more compact cities.   
In addition to Blom-Hansen’s list of factors we might add the influence of local actors or agents.  The 
interface between central and local government is a dynamic one, constantly evolving and affected by 
the attitude and performance of key agencies, such as government departments and individual local 
authorities.  Governments cannot act as free agents.  Although Parliament may have the authority to 
abolish local government it ultimately depends on the resources of councils and other local actors for 
political support, information, expertise and the implementation of policies.  As a result the ‘nuclear’ 
option, that is the removal altogether of the local government system, is not one that we have seen 
exercised in advanced democracies.  While formal structures, such as constitutions or parliamentary 
conventions, set the context for relationships it is often the informal networks, local and national, that 
have a significant influence on what happens.  Formal institutions are in fact underpinned by informal 
policy networks in which central government actors interact with other actors, such as local 
government staff and local politicians.  One way of describing the nature of these inter-governmental 
relationships involves distinguishing between three types of actors: Topocrats, Expenditure Advocates 
and Expenditure Guardians (Blom-Hansen 1999). 
• Topocrats are the representatives of sub-national governments, usually associations set up to 
defend the interest of their members at the national level.  Blom-Hansen argues that these 
associations are increasingly important in national policy making and act as guardians of local 
government interests in the national political process. Their default focus tends to be to protect 
the autonomy, fiscal viability and integrity of the particular level of government they speak for. 
 
• Expenditure Advocates are actors in the bureaucracy who have an interest in promoting new 
public programmes, increasing funding for existing programmes or developing new types of 
regulations.  Essentially they are a bureaucratic force working for specific sector goals within the 
public sector and have a propensity for increasing the range of activities provided by sub-national 
governments or enhancing the quality and quantity of existing services.  
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• Expenditure Guardians are those actors within the bureaucracy who have an interest in macro-
economic control and restraining public expenditure and activity. They are typically central 
agencies, such as the New Zealand Treasury. 
Inter-governmental relationships are consequently the result of processes intended to resolve tensions 
between the idea of local autonomy (promoted by Topocrats), sector policy goals (advocated by 
Expenditure Advocates), and macroeconomic control (promoted by state sector agencies concerned 
with macro-economic policy or Expenditure Guardians).  Good public policy is achieved when a 
balance is reached between the three participants, that is, council autonomy is not undermined and 
departments achieve their policy goals while operating within a sound macro-economic and fiscal 
policy envelope.  In the New Zealand context there is a single local government association, Local 
Government New Zealand, which has an undisputed mandate to represent local government’s national 
interests.7  The Expenditure Guardian is the Treasury, the Government’s financial adviser while an 
example of an Expenditure Advocate is the Ministry of Health.  Policies promoted by the Ministry of 
Health frequently have an impact on council balance sheets, such as its recent policy to require 
councils to improve the quality of drinking water.  Local Government New Zealand advocated that 
compliance by councils should be voluntary in order to reduce the cost, an approach that government 
Ministers eventually agreed with.  
Political theory can also have an impact on the nature of the central-local government relationship.  
For example, the last two decades has seen a significant interest in decentralisation, driven by 
agencies like the World Bank that argue that public decision-making should be located as closely as 
possible to the citizens affected by those decisions, essentially the principle of subsidiarity.  
Subsidiarity is a normative principle in the sense that it argues that governance responsibilities should 
occur locally unless there are reasons, such as economies of scale or equity considerations, which 
justify locating responsibilities at a higher sphere of governance, either regionally or nationally.  As a 
principle it is variously endorsed around the world, most notably in the European Treaty, which 
enshrines the doctrine of subsidiarity as a fundamental criterion in European law making.8  
Subsidiarity first appeared in New Zealand policy discourse with the publication of the report of the 
Royal Commission on Social Policy (Royal Commission 1988) and its recommendation that the New 
Zealand government adopt subsidiarity as a policy framework.  While providing a theoretical 
justification for local governments to argue for greater authority and autonomy it has not featured at 
                                           
7 Local Government New Zealand was formed in 1996 with the amalgamation of three separate associations. There are 
seventy eight councils, all of which are currently members. 
8 As an example of the principle at work see the European Charter of Local Self Government. 
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all since the Royal Commission’s proposals, which have been generally ignored by successive 
governments. 
Where there has been greater decentralisation and/or a move to giving local government greater 
autonomy (such as the effect of local government reform in 2002 in New Zealand) the nature of the 
dialogue between central and local government has inevitably changed.  Hand in hand with the idea 
that councils might exercise increased discretion has been the recognition that some form of 
mechanism to share information and discuss policy with higher level governments is necessary, 
leading to a consequential change in governance models.  Montin (2000), for example, describes the 
growth of an integration list model of local government, particularly in Scandinavia, which has 
developed in response to national governments taking a more active role in monitoring and setting 
standards for local activities undertaken by councils.  
Local empowerment, combined with greater integration, contributes to a picture of growing 
complexity in the central-local government relationship, with an emphasis on shared resources, 
knowledge and goals.  Empowerment and integration also have an impact on the different instruments 
by which governments ‘steer’ their local governments, as noted above.  This raises the practical 
question of how to engage with local governments, since there are likely to be numerous entities and 
engaging with each of them separately will have significant transaction costs.  It is a situation 
designed for the creation of a local government association (the Topocrat) to fulfil the need for 
governments to find a single point of engagement and local governments to find a single voice for 
articulating their interests.  With local government associations as the natural point of contact or 
engagement we are left with the question of how best to involve them in the policy and decision 
making process.  One option is the development of guidelines or protocols. For example: 
 
• The standing orders of the German Federal Parliament require that local government associations 
are consulted on legislation and policy affecting local government interests.  
 
• The Swiss constitution declares that the Swiss Federation shall take into account the possible 
consequences of its actions on municipalities.  
 
• The South African constitution provides that municipalities will have the right to comment on any 
draft legislation that might affect them. South African local government has also been given the 
right to appoint 10 members to the second parliamentary chamber where they are able to 
participate ex officio in deliberations.  
• The local government associations in Austria, representing cities, towns and the municipalities, 
are recognised in that country’s constitution, with the state having an obligation to involve them 
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when debating European Union proposals with local implications.  The Austrian constitution also 
requires the government to consult with local government representatives before new legislation 
that might have an important financial impact on councils is enacted.   
 
• In Western Australia the state government invites councils, through their Local Government 
Association (WALGA), to propose projects for consideration in the state government’s annual 
budget. The Association calls for expressions of interest from its members and evaluates projects 
against agreed criteria before submitting proposed projects.  
 
• The memorandum of agreement between the Tasmanian Local Government Association and the 
state government includes protocols which set standards for consultation as well as a mechanism 
for dealing with cases where consultation may have failed.  
Central-local government engagement is a process that involves a number of actors and a variety of 
institutional forms. As Blom-Hansen shows, one of the critical dynamics is the relative roles and 
status of local government associations (the Topocrats), Expenditure Advocates and Expenditure 
Guardians.  His model caters for a situation in which there is a constant jockeying for influence 
between the three types of agencies.  The challenge for establishing meaningful and effective 
relationships is to find mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty created by this dynamic and enable 
both spheres of government to develop mutual plans for the social and economic advancement of 
communities and nations.  
 
Models compared 
Internationally central-local government engagement is a very diverse territory reflecting the unique 
constitutional arrangements of each country, particularly their federal or unitary status. While some 
systems provide local government with constitutional recognition, the nature of the provisions vary 
with regard to how engagement is approached ranging from prescriptive to silent.  Engagement is also 
influenced by the structure of sub-national government itself and their respective histories.  There are 
three broad approaches - legal, political and mixed:  
• The legal approach provides a legislative context for engagement, such as a parliamentary or 
constitutional duty to consult with local government which may go as far as to explicitly name 
the relevant local government association as the agency responsible for representing local 
government’s view.  The Municipal Association of Victoria (MAV) has such recognition.   
• The political approach involves mutual agreement between representatives of the higher level 
government and local government with regard to the rules and processes for ongoing 
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engagement.  The most common appear to be negotiated agreements and memoranda of 
understanding.   
 
• Engagement approaches do not need to be mutually exclusive and an ideal approach might very 
well be a mixed one, with both a legislative and political aspect, in which status is established by 
legislation or the constitution while practice is determined by agreement negotiated bilaterally.   
 
A number of jurisdictions have established permanent commissions or committees for managing the 
local central relationship. For example: 
Table 1 Structures 
Australia 
No constitutional recognition of local government but provides a seat for the president of 
the Local Government Association (ALGA) on the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) which meets to coordinate federal governance.9 
Switzerland 
Established a ‘tripartite agglomeration’ consisting of the federal government, the 
Conference of Cantons and other peak organisations for local government to coordinate 
governance. 
Spain Established a Commission of Local Governments which acts as catalyst for identifying municipal problems and communicating them to the government. 
Wales 
The Welsh Parliament is required to consider local government’s interests in its actions. It 
is also required to sustain and promote local government in Wales as well as to establish 
a Partnership Council consisting of members of the Assembly and local authorities.   
 
Formal entities, such as those identified above, appear to be most common in federal jurisdictions 
where the challenge of coordination is that much greater and engagement is multi-level, involving 
federal, provincial and local authorities.  More common are mutually negotiated protocols and 
guidelines or partnership agreements.  In addition to the use of formal entities the last decade has seen 
an increase in the use of protocols or broad ranging agreements that set out expectations of local and 
central governments towards each other.  For example, Blom-Hansen (1999) notes that all three 
Scandinavian countries use agreements between central authorities and local government associations 
as an alternative to legal regulation; he also notes that associations in the different countries have 
considerably different levels of influence.  
Agreements take a variety of forms.  In the UK, the Central-Local Concordat signed between the 
Local Government Association (LGA) and British Government in December 2007 included a joint 
commitment by both spheres of government in England to work for better outcomes for citizens and 
communities as well as stating each party’s rights and responsibilities in general terms.  The 
Concordat has been replicated in both Scotland and Wales.  The first step in Scotland was the 
formation of a Partnership Framework, agreed between the Council of Scottish Local Authorities 
                                           
9 The federal government has promised a national referendum in 2013 seeking approval to include reference to local 
government in the nation’s constitution.  Two previous attempts have failed. 
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(COSLA) and the Scottish Executive in 2001 - the Framework is a non-legally binding agreement 
which set out principles for the purpose of forming a partnership.  This has now been superseded by 
the Scottish Concordat, an agreement between the Scottish Executive and COSLA which focuses on 
commitments entered into during the life of the agreement; commitments include: 
 
• The Government commits not to undertake any structural reform of local government; 
• Local government agrees that councils will report to the Scottish Government annually on 
achievement of Scottish outcomes; 
• The Government commits to a specific level of funding 
• Councils agree to reduce bureaucracy.10 
The English Concordat, signed between the Minister of Local Government in the former Labour 
government and President of the LGA, was more of a strategic document than the Scottish version, 
which has a more instrumental and practical focus (for example, ‘councils will reduce bureaucracy’).  
It spells out the relative roles of local and central government and outlines the respective rights and 
responsibilities of each sector.  For example: 
 
• Central government has the right to set national policies … and to intervene to 
prevent underperformance; 
• Councils have the right to address the priorities of their local communities … and 
shape its future without unnecessary interference; 
• The partners to this agreement will come together regularly in a new local central 
partnership. 
The concordant has not been renewed by the new Conservative Liberal Democratic government at 
this stage however the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons has 
recently produced an “Illustrative Code for Central and Local Government” which is set out as the 
basis of a future agreement.11 
The Australian experience with agreements 
Agreements are widely used by states and local government associations throughout Australia.  Their 
potential for harmonising relationships was recognised as early as 2003 by the Australian Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration when, in their report Rates and Taxes 
(Commonwealth 2003), they noted that it “would be beneficial to establish formal governance 
                                           
10 See http://www.cvsfife.org/publications/concordat.pdf 
11 See www.parliament.uk/pcrc) 
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relationships and consequent financial agreements between the levels of government” 
(Commonwealth 2003, p. 17).  The Committee went on to argue that partnership agreements have the 
capacity to enable states and local governments to respond to the articulated needs of their 
communities through agreed plans and resources.   
 
The Committee considers that one of the keys to reform is intergovernmental partnerships. 
Partnerships help to ensure that government services are effectively and efficiently delivered at 
the local level. They are an important step towards improving the relationship between local 
government and other spheres of government in the future (ibid p. 18). 
Contributing to the Committee’s inquiry, the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) 
suggested that agreements would be able to provide more certain policy outcomes due to more 
predictable levels of funding; allowed better specification of performance; a greater level of 
transparency and provided a meaningful framework for reprioritising and reallocating resources 
within and across government (Commonwealth 2003). 
A number of Australian States, such as Western Australia, Tasmania and South Australia, have signed 
agreements with their respective local government associations which are similar to the English 
Concordat but of more limited scope.  Unlike the Concordat, these agreements tend to be more 
operational and take the form of a memorandum of understanding which commits each sector to 
particular behaviours in relation to the other, covering issues such as communication and consultation.  
There is also an inter-governmental agreement establishing principles for managing the relationships 
between all the states and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).   
South Australia 
The South Australian Agreement, negotiated between the state government and the South Australian 
Local Government Association (SALGA), set agreed principles and established a Ministers’ Local 
Government Forum to “address some of the complex and challenging issues between the two spheres 
of government” (Tiley and Dollery 2010, p. 33). It places considerable weight on process, such as the 
requirement to consult, and includes a provision for dealing with disagreements.  One of the 
commitments agreed by SALGA is to determine the process it will use to find a sector view on topical 
issues. Key components of the South Australian Agreement include: 
• a broad sense of purpose including the goal of enhancing efficiency, effectiveness, coordination 
and infrastructure; 
• a desire to improve integration of strategic planning; 
• a desire to foster more consistent approaches to policy and legislation; 
• a recognition that disagreements will arise; 
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• key principles such as mutual recognition, consultation and financial relationships (including a 
commitment to provide funding sources to accompany new functions); 
• processes for communication and consultation; 
• implementation and review provisions.12 
The Agreement is not legally binding.  It is described instead as being a statement of intent to guide 
attitudes and practice.  It also contains a schedule of priorities which are meant to be negotiated 
annually between the state government and SALGA, such as a commitment for the two spheres of 
government to work together in areas such as strategic planning, governance and financial 
management, economic development and building communities. 
Western Australia 
The Western Australia Agreement involves the Western Australia Local Government Association 
(WALGA), the state of Western Australia and the WA Local Government Managers’ Association 
(WALGA 2010).  The Premier signed for the state, and the Agreement is witnessed by the Minister 
for Local Government and Regional Development.  This Agreement consists only of three schedules, 
which are the partnership principles, a template for partnership agreements that can be used by other 
local government organisations and a framework for state local government partnerships.  The over-
riding principle being a commitment to improving co-operation between state and local government to 
enhance the sustainable social, environmental and economic development of Western Australia 
through consultation, communication, participation, co-operation and collaboration at both strategic 
and project levels.  Other principles deal with timely communication, purposeful consultation, the 
importance of partnerships and clarity around roles.  Western Australia also uses agreements between 
the association and state government for more specific objectives, such as library provision and 
regional development.  
Victoria 
Although it lacks a specific agreement of the form found in other Australian states, the Municipal 
Association of Victoria (MAV) has built up a strong relationship with its state government which has 
resulted in the creation of a number of effective mechanisms through which it is able to influence state 
policy. This involves: 
 
 
                                           
12 See www.SALGA.asn.au for a copy of the Agreement 
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• Regular meetings between the leaders of both sectors.  The state representatives are the premier, 
local government minister and advisers while MAV is represented by their president, chief 
executive and political adviser. No minutes of the meetings are kept and no papers are prepared 
in advance – they are intentionally designed to allow free and frank discussion to highlight 
emerging issues from either sector, test out ideas and get things fixed.  These meetings are a way 
of ensuring potential differences are recognised in advance and conflict possibly diverted. (MAV 
employ as a member of staff an experienced political adviser who is responsible for managing 
political and agency relationships.)13 
 
• The opportunity for the MAV chief executive to brief departmental advisers and chiefs of staff 
on local government issues.  This mechanism, which is undertaken by the Chief Executive and 
key advisers, allows the association to brief central government advisers on emerging issues (an 
early warning mechanism) and to be briefed in turn of any plans held by departments or ministers 
with implications for councils.  The ability to play this role has been acquired over time with the 
association winning respect from, and building a level of trust within, the bureaucracy.   
 
MAV has found that working closely with the state government is the best way to realise policy gains 
despite pressure from some member councils for the association to take a more publicly critical role.  
To date the board has taken the view that maintaining a constructive relationship is important in order 
to provide what is a unique opportunity to contribute to policy-making at an early stage.  
New South Wales 
In contrast, the New South Wales Local Government and Shires Association, while maintaining good 
working relationships with some portfolio ministers, has been unable to build any kind of formal 
relationship with the state premier or his office.14  Although months were spent in drafting a formal 
inter-governmental agreement the previous minister and premier were unwilling to sign up.  In the 
Association’s view the problem stems from political instability at the state level with four local 
government ministers in the last term and a centralising culture or a “state knows best” attitude (NSW 
still has rate pegging which is blamed for the poor state of local government infrastructure.)  The 
recent change of government at the state level appears to also have changed the dynamics of the 
relationship with ministers more willing to engage.15  
 
 
                                           
13 Interview between the author and MAV chief executive. 
14 This has since improved greatly since the election of a new State Government in 2011. 
15 Interview between the author and association staff. 
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Tasmania 
The state of Tasmania has taken a comprehensive approach to partnership agreements, a programme 
that was initiated as early as 1998 and involves partnerships agreements between the state and the 
local government association as well as the state and individual councils.  The partnership agreements 
program was launched in 1998 in order to “better service Tasmanian communities by the two levels of 
government working together” (Tiley and Dollery 2010, p. 23). There are now four types of 
partnership agreements: 
• Bilateral – agreements between individual councils and the state government; 
• Regional – agreements between regional bodies or groups of councils and the state government; 
• Statewide – agreements between the LGA of Tasmania and the state government; 
• Tripartite – agreements between the Australian Government, the state government and local 
governments. 
A review of the partnership programme (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2008) made a number of 
recommendations for strengthening and improving the programme. The review noted that the 
agreement programme had met its objectives in terms of partnering with councils to deliver local 
outcomes; had success in addressing significant social, economic and environmental issues and had 
embedded more efficient service delivery across a number of policy areas.  Amongst its 
recommendations the review suggested that the objectives of the agreements be amended to: 
 
• Enhance the strong and cooperative relationship between the state government and local 
government; 
• Contribute to the delivery of the state government’s strategic economic, social and 
environmental priorities; 
• Support the delivery of local government’s strategic priorities at a statewide and regional level; 
• Build regional capacity focusing on agreed high-level priorities; 
• Identify and deliver joint initiatives that contribute to the well-being of local 
communities (Local Government Division 2008). 
In particular officials recommended that partnership agreements: be endorsed at the highest level; be 
shorter sharper agreements comprising high-priority, achievable and measurable initiatives; focus on 
improving cohesion and coordination across agreements; link state, regional and local agreements as 
appropriate and ensure that major policies and programmes are supported and delivered at all levels.  
There was also a recognition that the regional approach to service delivery should be enhanced and an 
investment should be made to build regional capacity.  Tiley and Dollery (2010) suggest that the 
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existence of the agreements made it much easier for the state government to carry out its programme 
to create three corporations to manage councils’ wastewater.  
Other jurisdictions 
Agreements are also used in Canada, for example the agreement between the Province of Ontario and 
the Ontario Association of Municipalities which not only sets out a mutual commitment to consult but 
also states the province’s commitment to respect the right of councils to handle matters within their 
jurisdiction.  A schedule of quarterly meetings to be held between the two parties is also included.  
The Agreement is jointly signed by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing and the 
Association’s President, and witnessed by their relative chief executives.  Running to nine pages with 
attachments the Agreement covers the following: 
 
• A joint commitment to policies for promoting the well-being of Ontario’s economy and society, 
for current and future generations; 
• Recognition of a need for a coordinated response to the problems facing society, regular 
consultation and respect for the role of municipalities as accountable and autonomous 
governments in relation to activities within their jurisdictions; 
• An outlined process for scheduling meetings and the manner in which the logistics will be 
carried out.16 
The Agreement has a life of three years, includes reference to the lead agencies responsible for its 
administration (Dept. of Housing and Local Government and the Association) and a commitment to 
meet regularly.  Consultation is a major component of the Agreement, particularly a commitment to 
prior consultation on behalf of the province, particularly where any proposed legislative or regulatory 
change will impact on councils’ current budget planning cycles. 
The Northern Ireland Local Government Association (NILGA), still in the relatively early days of 
political devolution, does not yet have any formal agreement with the Northern Ireland government.  
While committed to establishing a statutory relationship the association is involved in three types of 
non-statutory arrangements (as at 2009): 
 
• Quarterly meetings with the Local Government Minister; 
• Ad hoc meetings with ministers on specific issues; 
                                           
16 Accessed from http://www.amo.on.ca/wcm/Documents/amo/MOU/2010Dec_MOU_Joint_Statement.pdf 
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• The opportunity to nominate appropriate officers to participate in working groups or 
consultations. 
At the minimum agreements tend to specify processes designed to provide surety of communication 
and consultation.  Some go further, using agreements as a basis for negotiating future goals and 
targets and a local government commitment to their achievement.  Yet agreements are far from 
universal, New Zealand being a case in point, despite the existence of an inter-governmental forum 
which has been in place for more than twelve years.  Understanding why the political environment in 
New Zealand has not been conducive to some sort of inter-government agreement may improve our 
understanding of the factors that govern the nature of the arrangements designed to improve co-
ordination and alignment between central and local government in other contexts. 
The New Zealand experience 
The model of local government which emerged out of New Zealand’s colonial past was, not 
surprisingly, firmly based within the Anglo Saxon tradition and as such shares common features with 
systems in Australia, Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom.  A feature of this model is local 
government’s legal and constitutional separation from central government.  Unlike the integrated 
nature of governing arrangements in much of continental Europe, the Anglo Saxon approach tends to 
emphasise accountability to voters rather than to higher authorities.  In this model, independence and 
autonomy are considered virtues and attempts by the centre to impose national or ‘one size fits all’ 
solutions are inevitably strongly contested.  (Although, as we shall see, there are suggestions that 
recent and proposed policy changes are shifting the New Zealand local government model towards the 
more integrated European approach.) 
The country’s colonial roots also explain why the state plays a larger role in community life than in 
virtually all other OECD countries, as the cost of developing infrastructure from scratch was often 
beyond the small and dispersed settlements that made up 19th Century New Zealand, leaving central 
government to make the investment.  Even so, by the mid 1930s councils in New Zealand were 
responsible for half of all public expenditure, a figure that, with the growth of the welfare state, had 
fallen to less than 10% eighty years later.  Also contributing to the relative dominance of central 
government was the fragmented nature of local governance that existed from the early 1850s to 1989, 
with local government reform in 1989 consolidating more than 850 local bodies in to 87 multi-
purpose local authorities.  Until that point in time local governments were regarded as small and 
without capacity to take on additional services.  As a result, New Zealand achieved the status of being 
the most centralised regime in the OECD (The Economist, Oct. 31, 2009).   
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The existence of a fragmented local government sector made the issue of how to align and coordinate 
local, regional and central government policy and action all the more salient and a number of attempts 
were made address the issue.  In 1975 a Territorial Government Consultative Group was established 
to initiate regular consultation and cooperation between central and local government (regional bodies 
were not represented – presumably because at that stage they had no national organisation).  
Consisting of the heads of the two local government associations and their chief executives (one 
representing counties which were rural councils while the other representing municipalities, which 
were largely urban) and the Minister of Local Government, the group provided for an interchange of 
views and was used by Ministers as a sounding board for various initiatives affecting councils.  
Sowman (1984), writing about the Consultative Group at the time, noted that it tended to focus on 
specific local government matters as opposed to the opportunity for local government to support 
broad national policies and reflected that it might take the Prime Minister to lift its focus. 
The Consultative Group did not survive the tumult of local government reform in 1989, and relations 
over the following decade were limited to irregular meetings between the head of the Local 
Government Association17 and the Minister of Local Government.  The prevailing view of the 
government of the time saw local government in largely instrumental terms as one of a range of 
possible service delivery bodies.  It was not until the election of the Labour Government in 1999 that 
the importance of central-local government relationships was once again acknowledged, to such an 
extent that the relationship was framed in partnership terms.  
A new approach to the relationship was flagged by the Labour Party while in opposition with its 
manifesto signalling the importance of inter-government collaboration and wanting “local bodies to 
operate with autonomy and freedom within a collaborative framework that allows levels of 
government to work for the best outcomes for communities” (Labour Party Election Manifesto 1999). 
It was a sentiment that surfaced strongly as it began a review of the Local Government Act 1974: 
The challenges facing New Zealand in areas such as sustainable development cannot be met 
by central government making decisions and acting on its own. They require a partnership 
approach within which central government, local government, and the voluntary and business 
sectors can work together (Lee 2001, p. 13).  
The government identified four objectives intended to guide its review of the LGA 1974; relevant to 
this discussion is bullet point number three, namely “involve the development of a partnership 
relationship between central and local government” (DIA 2001, p. 6).  Once enacted the LGA 2002 
was a signal that inter-government relationships were important (at least to the government of the day) 
                                           
17 In 1996 the Local Government Association, formed by a merger of the Counties Association and the Municipalities 
Association and later the Catchment Authorities Association, changed its name to Local Government New Zealand. 
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with the result that it stimulated a flourish of initiatives designed to improve relationships, despite 
criticism that they did not go far enough (see Thomas and Memon 2007, Local Futures 2006).   
The LGA 2002 (once again under review at the time of writing) was a significant milestone in the 
development of local government in New Zealand.  Not only did it replace an ageing ultra vires 
statute with a form of general empowerment but it refocused the purpose of local government on 
promoting community well-being and strengthened ‘social’ accountability, that is, accountability to 
citizens through a greater emphasis on consultation with citizens, long term planning and allowing 
communities to set outcomes in order to steer their councils.  Strengthening local government’s 
community accountability and establishing processes to enable citizens themselves to set desired 
outcomes set the scene for more effective relationships with central government and its agencies.  In 
fact the purpose of long term planning included the desire to: 
 
• Promote better co-ordination and application of community resources; 
• Inform and guide the setting of priorities in relation to the activities of the local authority and 
other organisations (s73, LGA 2002). 
The legislation had an implicit sense of community governance suggesting that councils should be 
facilitating a process through which communities could influence departmental priorities.  The result 
was a series of initiatives designed to build alignment and relationships at both a bureaucratic and 
political level, for example: 
 
• A Deputy Secretaries' Group was established to coordinate engagement between central 
government agencies and local governments; 
• An advisory group, the Local Government Interface Team, was established and located in the 
regions, to encourage government departments to contribute to process for identifying community 
outcomes and improve relationships with departments; 
• The Department of Internal Affairs established a community outcomes website to highlight good 
examples of central-local government collaboration; 
• The Department of Internal Affairs (DIA 2007) also developed guidelines to assist other 
departments when developing regulations that were to be implemented by local government, 
addressing councils’ concerns about lack of consultation;18 
• Regional inter-agency networks sprang up across the country with a focus on aligning local and 
central government investments;19 
                                           
18 See http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Resource-material-Our-Policy-Advice-Areas-Policy-development-
guidelines-for-regulatory-functions-involving-local-government?OpenDocument 
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• The Ministry of Social Development, established regional commissioners to better enable 
engagement with local authorities; 
• In addition the Government made a commitment to hold a forum between the Prime Minister and 
relevant members of Cabinet and local government leaders twice a year to be known as the 
central-local government forum.   
One impact of the suite of relationship initiatives was a greater willingness to involve local 
government representatives when central government departments were developing policies with the 
potential impact on councils.  Involvement, however, was not uniform and often depended on the 
good will of departments.  In fact, it was frustration with the way some departments approached 
engagement that led to the development of the regulatory guidelines (see above).  Engagement on the 
ground was also patchy as government departments had centralised or regionalised to such a degree 
that they lacked presence in a number of council areas.  The DIA local government interface team 
often found itself filling the gap in those districts where a departmental presence was lacking (DIA 
2007).  In the Auckland region, the country’s largest urban configuration, the Government established 
an office to better coordinate its relationship with the 7 councils of the Auckland region.20  The result 
was that government officials played an active part in regional urban planning promoting the 
Government’s objectives, particularly its focus on sustainable development.   
Central-local Government Forum meetings have occurred since 2000 and involve the Prime Minister 
and relevant members of Cabinet who meet with the national council of Local Government New 
Zealand (the Local Government Association), which represents all the councils. 21 The meetings 
create a space in which representatives of the two sectors can engage in dialogue as equals and the 
goal is free and frank discussion, although in practice that is seldom achieved.  While there is an 
executive position of Minister of Local Government, the position is normally lowly ranked in terms of 
Cabinet seniority and is focussed on managing relationships in order to reduce political risk.22  In 
practice the Forum has provided a mechanism that allows the local government sector, through the 
association, to bypass the institutional filters that operate within departments, to allow sector 
representatives to raise concerns directly with appropriate ministers, who, with the Prime Minister as 
Forum chair, are frequently tasked with finding solutions.   
                                                                                                                                   
19 See community outcomes Bay of Plenty (COBOP) at www.cobop.govt.nz 
20 Formerly known as GUEDO it is now described as the New Zealand Government’s Auckland Policy Office.  
21 The National-led Government has reduced the frequency of the forum to one annually. 
22 After the 2008 elections the post of Minister of Local Government was given to a minor party in the coalition and placed 
outside cabinet. 
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The Central-Local Government Forum replicates at a governance level initiatives that occur with a 
degree of regularity at an officials’ level. For example, the Ministry for the Environment holds an 
annual meeting to which all council chief executives are invited to discuss environmental issues.  In 
recent years there have also been short-lived collaborations between officials in the area of 
sustainability, local government funding and social policy.  The ability to influence government 
policy and the quality of relationships through the Forum possibly explains the lack of interest in any 
type of formal agreement, in addition to the original terms of reference.  However, the degree of 
influence appears to have been strongly dependent on the Prime Minister of the time, her knowledge 
of local government (as a former councillor and political studies lecturer) and the dynamic of the 
relationship established with the President of Local Government New Zealand. 
A change of government in 2008 had a major effect on the nature and style of inter-governmental 
relations.  The new National led government was impatient for change and had little time for officials’ 
activities that failed to lead to specific actions.  Within two years the Deputy Secretaries’ Group had 
been wound up; the Local Government Interface Team was made redundant and the central-local 
government forum reduced to an annual meeting, with a willingness to meet in smaller task focussed 
meetings.  And a range of changes were made and proposed to the LGA 2002 that removed the 
requirement for the community to identify outcomes, refocused the activities of councils on ‘so 
called’ core services, and sought to restrict the discretion of councils to respond to local issues – 
ultimately an attempt to down-size the local government sector.  Only within Auckland did the 
previous configuration of government agencies working with councils continue and was in fact 
enhanced.  Within two years of their election the Government had managed to merge the seven 
councils of the Auckland region into one, a large unitary council of 1.5 million residents.  The 
expected economic potential of such a large city was seen to justify a significant policy presence in 
Auckland as well as an annual forum between Cabinet and the Auckland Council. 
The new approach to inter-governmental relationships was epitomised by a statement by the then 
Minister of Local Government, the Hon Nick Smith, who stated that “the broad purpose of the LGA 
2002 ... creates false expectations about what councils can achieve and confusion over the proper 
roles with respect to central government and the private sector” (Smith 2012, p6).  The Government 
sees local government in strictly instrumentalist terms, responsible for the provision of narrowly 
defined services and finds little value in measures to promote collaboration and inter-governmental 
working, unless they are project focussed.  In practice it appears to reinstate a more traditional 
command and control approach as opposed to the more indirect steering approaches now found in 
much of the world as noted by Kelly (2006) and Leuprecht and Lazar (2007). 
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Although flagged by Local Government New Zealand in its briefing to the Government, no interest in 
some form of inter-government agreement or high level protocol has so far been shown.  This has 
disadvantaged the local government sector in its efforts to influence government policy, as it affects 
councils and their communities, and left the nature of inter-governmental relationships seriously 
dependent on the style and preferences of individual actors.  Disadvantage is made that much worse 
by New Zealand local government’s weak constitutional status.  New Zealand lacks a written 
constitution and local government’s powers are set by a simple majority within parliament leading to 
a highly unstable legislative framework. 
Conclusion 
An inescapable feature of the central-local government relationships in New Zealand, as in many 
countries, is its asymmetry.  Without a strong constitutional reference and a constitutional court with 
oversight, relationships exist entirely at the discretion of the national partner which has the power and 
authority to write the rules as it sees fit.  Even where local government is constitutionally recognised 
national governments hold considerable scope to alter operational processes, funding and functions.  
Within this context it is often left to national local government associations, the Topocrats, to use 
what influence they can muster to ensure local governments have the legislative frameworks to enable 
them to fulfil their obligations to citizens.  With or without the protection of some form of 
constitutional recognition, agreements appear to be useful mechanisms for enabling local 
governments influence the agenda of higher level authorities, even if all they achieve is regular 
contact and communication.  In fact agreements themselves vary from a heavy emphasis on principles 
to those which are largely process driven with some jurisdictions using them to set annual targets 
specifically designed to influence council priority setting and decision-making.   
The interface will also be influenced by the degree to which there is overlapping political 
membership. In many countries political parties have an active presence at the local government level 
providing a non-constitutional mechanism through which local members are able to influence their 
national colleagues and vice versa.23  Many members of national parliaments are familiar with local 
governments for the simple reason that they began their political careers as local councillors 
(generally a good idea as it helps develop political skills and experiment with policies at the local 
level before trying them out on the nation as a whole).  That experience has the potential to create 
allies and advocates when matters of local government are being discussed. Similarly, where councils 
                                           
23 The English LGA has separate caucuses representing the three major parties and the association president is selected from 
the party which has the most majorities after local government elections. 
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have a majority of councillors who are also members of the party in charge of the higher level 
government networks are established which can assist alignment.  
Banner (2002) suggests that countries with the Anglo-American local government model are moving 
towards a kind of “co-operative-dualism” which holds out prospects for a sustained dialogue between 
central and local government.  As a possible example, consider the Australian Government’s 
Department of Regional Development and Local Government’s suggestion that improving co-
ordination is necessary to achieve better and more efficient service delivery outcomes: 
 
Many people believe local government should have a greater role in partnering with the 
Australian Government in fulfilling the national policy agenda, particularly in areas such as, 
for example, regional development, transport and communications, environmental 
management and indigenous issues (Dept. of Regional Australia 2002). 
Australia has the complexity of brokering relationships across three spheres of government; in 
contrast New Zealand is in the fortunate position of managing only two, although this is no guarantee 
for success.  In fact recent legislative change suggests that New Zealand is moving in the opposite 
direction with less sustained dialogue and much more direction-setting by the centre.  Yet for the sake 
of effective governance at the local and community level it is important that both central and local 
government ensure that their policies, programmes and long term investments are as aligned as 
possible.   
If nothing else, engagement between national and sub-national governments has a symbolic value in 
that it reinforces the notion that local government plays a critical role in the governance of places, and 
that this actually matters.  From a local perspective, council leaders who can show how local services 
contribute to the ‘bigger picture’, and promote the interests of the nation as well as use their position 
to ensure nationally provided services address local priorities, are more likely to generate support 
from their own constituents and enhance trust and respect in the process of government itself.  
Increasing confidence and trust in government while addressing local issues must be a desirable 
outcome. 
The future success of New Zealand, and indeed all countries with multi-level governance systems, 
depends upon utilizing the respective strengths of government at local, regional and national levels 
and ensuring duplication is kept to a minimum, councils have an empowering statute to work under 
that does not contain unnecessary transaction costs and central government is able to focus on the 
strategic issues facing the nation.  For this to happen there needs to be ongoing communication, 
acknowledgement and respect between the various spheres of government.  Councils should be the 
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government’s eyes and ears ensuring national decision-makers are aware of the impacts of their 
policies outside the capital while providing feedback on the impact of policies and programmes.  For 
the government there is advantage in being able to ‘piggy back’ on local initiatives.  
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